Recent developments in many industrialized countries have triggered a debate on whether monetary policy is e¤ective when the nominal interest rate is close to zero. When the nominal interest rate hits its lower bound, the monetary authority is no longer in a position to pursue a policy of monetary easing by lowering nominal interest rates further. In this paper, I assess the implications of the zero lower bound in a DSGE model with …nancial frictions. The analysis shows that in a framework with …nancial frictions, when the interest rate is at the lower bound, the initial impact of a negative shock is ampli…ed and the economy is more likely to plunge into a recession. I assess whether di¤erent macro policies, such as the management of expectations by the central bank or a counter-cyclical …scal stimulus, may help recover
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Introduction
By the second quarter of 2009, policy interest rates had fallen below one per cent in Canada, the United Kingdom, the euro area, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States and most of all Japan. These developments have triggered a debate on whether monetary policy is impotent at the zero bound and have hence revived interest in policies that might alleviate the costs associated with nominal interest rates close to the zero lower bound (hereafter, ZLB). On the one hand, price-level targeting (hereafter, PLT) has emerged as a potentially more successful strategy to anchor expectations than in ‡ation targeting (e.g. Reifschneider and Williams (2000) ; Svensson (2000) ; Smets (2010)). The reason is that agents expecting policy to be loosened also expect future in ‡ation to be higher, which in turn reduces real rates now and therefore reduces the amount by which the central bank needs to cut nominal rates to bring about the real rate stimulus it needs. 1 On the other hand, with the prospect of a severe global recession following the 2007-2008 crisis, many governments have put forward …scal stimulus plans in order to underpin a recovery 2 . The 1 Nevertheless, the performance of a PLT rule needs to confront several issues. First, central banks need to establish credibility, otherwise the attractiveness of the price-level target vis-à-vis to an in ‡ation target might be reduced. However, Cateau and Dorich (2011) point out that with an occasionally binding ZLB even an imperfectly credible PLT rule will dominate an in ‡ation targeting rule. Second, the bene…ts of a PLT rule depend on the assumption that expectations are forward-looking. The bene…cial impact of a PLT rule on in ‡ation expectations was lacking in the …rst strand of theoretical analysis based on backward-looking models, as in Lebow, Roberts, and Stockton (1992), Haldane and Salmon (1995) and Fillion and Tetlow (1994) . 2 To list some examples: the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in the United States; the "Konjunkturpakete I und II" in Germany; the "Plan de reliance" in France;
supportive …scal policy stance during the recession has been motivated by the belief that with policy interest rates near zero, the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy is uncertain, and therefore a counter-cyclical …scal stimulus could be more e¤ective in pulling the economy out from recession (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011); Erceg and Lindé (2009); Woodford (2011) ).
The ZLB continues to pose challenges also in the aftermath of the global recession. Several major economies are likely to face imminent deleveraging that will limits the borrowing capacity of debtors with a high marginal propensity to consume. The presence of the ZLB on nominal interest rates could prevent central banks from reducing interest rate su¢ ciently in order to induce creditors to spend more, and thus o¤set the decline in spending by debtors. Motivated by these developments, this paper has two aims. First, it assesses whether a lower bound on nominal interest rates might deepen the recession, in the presence of frictions in …nancial markets. Second, it evaluates the extent to which macroeconomic policies (namely, a price-level target and …scal stimulus) might alleviate problems posed by the ZLB.
The ZLB constraint combined with the …nancial accelerator mechanism on the implications of the ZLB in a framework with …nancial frictions. To my knowledge, the only work that sheds light on this aspect is Carillo and Poilly (2010) . In this paper, I contribute to the existing literature by introducing …nancial frictions in a DSGE model with a binding ZLB constraint. This provides insights to the analysis of the implications of the ZLB constraint in a framework with …nancial frictions.
The structure of the model is a closed economy DSGE model which contains standard features, such as investment adjustment costs and sticky prices. In addition, I add …nancial frictions that are formalized as in Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1995) and Gertler (1989, 1998) . The source of the …nancial accelerator is the asymmetric information that will make it costly for lenders to evaluate the quality of enterprises'investments.
For this reason, lenders require a premium for external funds over the riskfree interest rate. Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1995) show that under the optimal contract, the external …nance risk premium depends on the enterprises'balance sheet position. Therefore, the …nancial accelerator mechanism introduces a positive relationship between the external …nance premium and entrepreneurs'net worth. The underlying mechanism works in the following way. During a …nancial downturn, adverse shocks lower current cash ‡ows and hence reduce the ability of …rms to self-…nance investment projects. This decline in net worth raises the external …nance premium and the cost of new investments. Falling investment reduces economic activity and cash ‡ow in subsequent periods, amplifying and propagating the e¤ect of the initial shock.
A binding ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates might hinder the recovery, as central banks are no longer able to counter the recessionary spiral triggered by the …nancial accelerator mechanism.
Several interesting results are derived. First, in a framework with …nancial frictions, the ZLB ampli…es the e¤ects of a negative shock by hindering the ability of the central bank to o¤set the negative e¤ects of an adverse shock.
Second, the price level is a better target than in ‡ation in order to prevent the ZLB being reached, as it lifts in ‡ation expectations in the face of de ‡ationary shocks. Third, in such a framework with …nancial frictions and lower interest rate, a counter-cyclical …scal stimulus could be more e¤ective in helping the economy recover from recession. The ZLB ampli…es the stimulative e¤ect of the …scal intervention. This latter result is in line with Carillo and Poilly (2010), but holds in a more general context. While in Carillo and Poilly (2010) , this results hinges on the assumption of nominal liabilities and works through the debt-de ‡ation e¤ect, here the mechanism is more simple: the higher in ‡ation generated by the …scal stimulus reduces the real interest rate and this channel supports investment and ampli…es the impact of the …scal stimulus on GDP. Therefore, the assumption of nominal liability is not a necessary condition to conclude in favour of …scal stimulus in the proximity of the ZLB. Moreover, compared to Carillo and Poilly (2010) , this paper sheds light on additional aspects, including the timing and the duration of the …scal stimulus as well as the bene…ts of a PLT rule. Results demonstrate that to be e¤ective, …scal stimulus should be implemented promptly and need to be removed when the ZLB ceases to bind.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I develop the model. In 
Model presentation
The model used is a closed economy DSGE model similar to Christensen and Dib (2006) . The model contains standard features, such as adjustment cost on investment and sticky prices. In addition, I add …nancial frictions as in Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1995) and Gertler (1989, 1998 ).
There are …ve sectors in the economy: households, entrepreneurs, capital producers, retailers and …nal goods producers. Households …nance entrepreneurs' purchase of capital by lending deposits. The presence of asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and lenders creates …nancial frictions which make entrepreneurial demand for capital depend on their …nancial position. Capital producers build un…nished capital and sell it to entrepreneurs. Competitive …nal good …rms combine …nal capital goods produced by entrepreneurs and labour supplied by households. They combine these two factors to produce a homogeneous …nal good. Retailers are the source of nominal frictions. They di¤erentiate the homogeneous …nal good and sell it in monopolistically competitive retail markets. They set nominal prices in a staggered fashion à la Calvo. Finally, I assume that exogenous shocks are su¢ ciently large to force the nominal interest rate to hit its ZLB on impact.
When the ZLB constraint becomes binding, the nominal interest rate is kept constant at the zero value, while when the ZLB is not binding the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate, according to a standard Taylor rule.
Households
Preferences of households at time t are described by:
where is the discount factor, C t is a composite consumption index and H t is labour supply. Let the functional form of u be given by:
A consumer's revenue ‡ow comes from her supply of hours of work to …rms for wages W t , pro…ts t from …rms and the return on assets B t , net of lump-sum taxes.
The …rst order conditions (hereafter, f.o.c.) from the maximization problem are:
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint and w t is the real wage. The disturbance term Z t represent a risk premium shock. 3 It drives a wedge between the interest rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets held by households. A positive risk premium shock increases the return on assets held by households and hence increases savings and reduces current consumption. At the same time, this shock also increases the cost of capital and reduces investment. The risk premium shock helps to explain the comovements of consumption and investment. 4 Z t follows the …rst-order autoregressive process:
where Z 2 (0; 1) is an autoregressive coe¢ cient and " Zt is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation Z .
Finally, for the Fisher condition, the real interest rate R t is de…ned as
where R n t is the gross nominal interest rate.
Production sectors 2.2.1 Capital producers
Production of un…nished capital goods is carried out by competitive …rms.
Newly produced capital goods replace depreciated capital and add to the capital stock. I assume that capital producers are subject to quadratic capital adjustment costs, so that the marginal return to investment in terms of capital goods is declining in the amount of investment undertaken, relative to the current capital stock. Capital producers make their production plans one period in advance. They maximize
("
The f.o.c. gives the standard Tobin's Q equation:
Furthermore, the capital stock evolves according to:
In addition, total output is also determined by exogenous government spending G t . I assume that exogenous spending follows a …rst-order autoregressive process:
is an autoregressive coe¢ cient and " Gt is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation G .
Final output is the sum of consumption, investment goods and government spending
Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs'behaviour is modelled along the line of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (hereafter, BGG). 5 The source of …nancial frictions is the existence of an agency problem that makes external …nance more expensive than internal funds. The entrepreneurs observe costlessly. their output which is subject to a random outcome. Lenders incur an auditing cost to observe an entrepreneur's output. After observing her project outcome, an entrepreneur decides whether to repay her debt or to default. If she defaults, the …nancial intermediary audits the loan and recovers the project outcome less monitoring costs. Accordingly, the marginal external …nancing cost is equal to a gross premium for external funds plus the gross real opportunity costs equivalent to the riskless interest rate. BGG show that the optimal contract implies that the external …nance premium depends on the entrepreneurs' balance sheet position. In particular, the external …nance premium increases with the leverage ratio. At the end of each period, entrepreneurs purchase capital that will be used in the next period. This capital purchase (
is partly …nanced through internal funds (entrepreneurs'net worth, N t ) and partly through external borrowing. The leverage ratio is de…ned as K t Q t 1 N t and the external …nance premium can thus be characterized by a functional form of the type s t = s K t Q t 1 N t X t where s 0 ( ) > 0 and s(1) = 1: The shock X t represents a …nancial shock to the external risk premium. It follows the …rst-order autoregressive process:
where
is an autoregressive coe¢ cient and " Xt is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation X . The entrepreneurs'demand for capital depends on the marginal productivity of capital and on the capital making assumptions on the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks (see De Graeve (2007)).
Moreover, in the standard BGG framework, the standard aggregate resource constraint is augmented with a term capturing the cost of bankruptcy. However, under a reasonable parametrization of the model, these costs are small and are therefore typically neglected (e. gain:
where F t+1 is the external funds rate and r K t+1 is the marginal productivity of capital, at t + 1: The risk premium disturbance a¤ects the cost of capital and not only the consumer Euler equation. This assumption allows commovements in consumption and investment to be modelled.
Thus, the demand for capital should satisfy the following optimality condition that states that the expected real return on capital is equal to the external …nancing cost:
To determine the external …nance premium, I adopt the following functional form:
where ! > 0: Therefore, at time t; the gross external …nance premium
, the elasticity of the external …nance premium with respect to the leverage ratio (!) and the disturbance term X t . 6 To ensure that entrepreneurs' net worth (the …rm's equity) will never be su¢ cient to fully …nance the new capital acquisition, following BGG, I
assume that entrepreneurs have a …nite life span. The probability that an entrepreneur will survive until the next period is , so the expected lifetime horizon is 1 1
. The entrepreneur's aggregate net worth is the equity held by entrepreneurs surviving from the previous period, and it is de…ned as follows:
The term in brackets is the value of surviving entrepreneurial …rms'capital, net of borrowing costs, carried over the previous period and D t is the transfer that 1 newly entering entrepreneurs receive from entrepreneurs that die.
The term D t ensures that new entrepreneurs can operate 7 .
Final goods producers
Production is carried out by …rms that follow a constant-returns-to-scale technology. To produce output Y t , …rms combine …nal capital goods and labour. The technology is de…ned as follows:
where A is the productivity parameter. Firms minimize production costs, so the …rst order conditions are:
where mc t denotes the marginal production cost for a …rms.
Retailers
Retailers purchase the wholesale goods at a price equal to nominal marginal costs and di¤erentiate them at no cost. They then sell these di¤erentiated retail goods on a monopolistically competitive market.
Following Calvo, I am assuming that …rms cannot change their selling prices unless they receive a random signal. The constant probability to receive such a signal is (1 '). Each …rm j sets the price p t (j) that maximizes the expected pro…t for l periods, where
is the average length of time that a price remains unchanged. The maximization problem is
The …rst order condition is:
The aggregate price is P
These equations lead to the following New Keynesian Phillips curve: 8 The demand function is derived from the de…nition of aggregate demand
#=# 1 and the corresponding price index in the monopolistic competition framework of Dixit and Stiglitz is P t+l = (
1=1 # where # is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods.
where t = P t P t 1 1 is the in ‡ation rate and mĉ t is the log deviation of real marginal cost from its steady-state level.
Monetary policy
I introduce the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, de…ning the Taylor rule in the following way:
The parameter governs the degree to which the in ‡ation rate is targeted around the desired target . Moreover, I am assuming that the monetary authority does not react immediately and adjust interest rate with a degree of inertia measured by RN . R n denotes the steady-state of the gross nominal interest rate. According to equation (22) 9 , if the ZLB is not binding the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule; if the ZLB is binding the monetary policy simply sets the nominal interest rate to zero 10 . The methodology adopted in 9 One caveat is that in this set-up, agents are not able to rationally anticipate the possibility of hitting the ZLB. Therefore they will not immediately reduce their output and in ‡ation expectations correspondingly. Therefore, the policy response is less aggressive than in a model in which agents were able to anticipate the possibility of hitting the ZLB. For a further discussion of the role of expectations in models with a zero lower bound on interest rates, see Adam ad Billi (2006) . 10 The condition R n t > 1; in terms of deviation from the steady-state, becomes R n t R = R n t 1 R;where R is the steady-state value of the gross nominal interest rate, de…ned as R = (1 + )
1 . ThereforeR n t > 1 (1 + ) 1 . As the net nominal interest rate at the steady-state is de…ned as r = (1 + ) 1 1, in terms of percentage deviation from the steady-state equation (22) implies that when the ZLB is bindingR 
Calibration
The model parameters are set to …t quarterly frequency. Table 1 3 The e¤ects of the ZLB constraint and …-nancial frictions
In this section, I start assessing the implications of the ZLB constraint on the nominal interest rate in a model that entails …nancial frictions. Then I
show that the presence of …nancial frictions makes the ZLB more likely to be hit.
For this purpose, I introduce two kinds of shocks: a negative demand shock (e.g. a risk premium shock) and an adverse …nancial shock (e.g. an increase in the external …nance risk premium). Both shocks are modelled as an AR (1) process with a fairly high degree of persistence (the autoregressive coe¢ cient is set equal to 0:9). The risk premium shock by increasing (reducing) the interest rate encourages (discourages) saving and hence a¤ects the lending side. The …nancial shock, by increasing the external …nance risk premium, makes external borrowing more expensive. In other words, it represents a tightening of credit conditions and hence a¤ects the borrowing side.
These two types of shocks are suitable for analyzing the dynamics when the ZLB is binding, as they put downward pressure on both output and in ‡ation, which can cause a binding ZLB. Therefore, this potentially creates a more severe downturn. I contrast the e¤ects under normal situations (i.e. when the central bank has the ability to lower interest rates in response to the demand shock) with a situation when the nominal short-term interest rate is subject to the lower bound. Then, I analyze whether the economy is likely to be pushed into a more severe recession when the ZLB binds. Finally, I compare the model speci…cation with …nancial frictions with that one without …nancial frictions, to assess the e¤ect of …nancial frictions.
In Figure 1 , I compare the responses to a risk premium shock under two alternative speci…cations of the model: the model without the ZLB constraint and a model which features a binding lower bound on the nominal interest rate. In this latter speci…cation, the real interest rate is limited in its possibility to stimulate the economy, after the initial drop in consumption and output. A risk premium shock reduces both private consumption and investment. On the one hand, this shock stimulates private savings by increasing the required return on assets held by households. On the other hand, the price of capital drops, as it depends positively on its expected value and the expected rental capital rate and negatively on the ex-ante real risk-free interest rate and the risk premium disturbance. The collapse of the capital price translates into lower investment and capital. The drop of both consumption and investment results in lower output and lower in ‡ation. The presence of the ZLB makes the drop in investment more severe, as the risk premium shock leads to a deterioration of the leverage ratio, an increase of the external …nance risk premium and a reduction of entrepreneurial net worth. This mechanism is ampli…ed when the ZLB constraint is binding and hence the increase in the external …nance risk premium is stronger. As a consequence, the cost of new investment raises and the recession is ampli…ed. Figure 2 displays the response of the main macro variables to a …nan-cial shock that pushes up the external …nance risk premium, worsening entrepreneurs' balance sheets. As enterprises are limited in their ability to self-…nance, the level of investment falls and the economy is pushed onto a recessionary-de ‡ationary path. The recession is ampli…ed if the lower bound on the nominal interest rate is binding, as the monetary authority is no longer able to o¤set the negative e¤ects of an adverse shock by using the nominal interest rate as an instrument.
Turning to the e¤ect of …nancial frictions, the analysis of the responses to the risk premium shock allows an evaluation of whether the nominal interest rate is more likely to hit its ZLB in the presence of …nancial frictions. Figure   3 shows that the risk premium shock reduces both private consumption and investments. On one side, this type of shock stimulates private savings by increasing the required return on assets held by households. If the …nancial accelerator mechanism is operative, the initial shock is ampli…ed. The underlying reasoning is the following: the price of capital depends negatively on the external …nancing cost, which is the risk-free real interest rate augmented by the …nancial risk premium. Therefore, in the presence of …nancial 
Is price-level targeting a solution?
In this section, I explore the issue of whether the price level is a better target for monetary policy in order to limit the probability of hitting the ZLB. The motivation is that -when expectations are forward-looking -a PLT rule introduces a desirable inertia that a¤ects the private sector's expectations;
hence it results in less volatile interest rates.
The mechanism operates as follows. Assume that a de ‡ationary distur-bance leads to a fall in the price level relative to the target (e.g. a negative demand shock). Economic agents observing the shock understand that the central bank will correct the deviation from the target aiming at an aboveaverage in ‡ation rate. As a result, in ‡ation expectations increase, which helps to mitigate the initial impact of the de ‡ationary shock. Under a credible price level target, in ‡ation expectations operate as automatic stabilizers.
The main di¤erence between in ‡ation-targeting (hereafter, IT) and PLT is that, under IT, unexpected disturbances to the price-level are ignored, while under PLT they are reversed. This implies that, under PLT, the price level has a predetermined targeted path and uncertainty about the future price level is bounded.
If the monetary authority is concerned about price level stability, the Taylor rule is modi…ed as follows:
where P t is the target or steady-state value for the price level at period t.
Note that for P = 1, the rule is the Taylor rule de…ned for in ‡ation targeting, while P = 0 signi…es pure price-level targeting. For 0 < P < 1 the rule is a hybrid one in which the central bank is concerned about reaching the in ‡ation target rate but also about the evolution of prices on the way to the in ‡ation target. Figure 4 shows that the probability of hitting the ZLB is lower if the monetary authority decides to target the price level instead of the in ‡ation rate. When agents are forward-looking and the monetary authority credibly commits to a PLT rule, such a rule yields a lower variability of in ‡ation and of nominal interest rates. Agents expect that the monetary authority will correct the deviation from the target aiming at an above-average in ‡a-tion rate. Private sector expectations of future in ‡ation after a de ‡ationary shock dampen the initial disin ‡ation and -hence -stabilize interest rates.
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Therefore, a PLT rule will lower the probability to hit the ZLB for the nominal interest rate.
The e¤ectiveness of …scal stimulus in times of crisis
In this section, I explore whether …scal policy is a good tool when the ZLB Again, the …scal stimulus is implemented in the initial period. If the ZLB is 12 I assume that all households are forward-looking and optimize their spending decisions. Recent literature has proposed to assume that many households are constrained to consume all their current income. The presence of constrained non-Ricardian households is in general conducive to raising the level of aggregate consumption in response to government spending shocks when compared with the speci…cation without non-Ricardian households. However, some authors (e.g. Coenen and Straub (2005) , Bilbiie, Meier and Müller (2008), Cogan, Cwick, Taylor and Wieland (2010)) have estimated that the share of non-Ricardian households is relatively low both in the U.S. and in the euro area. Therefore, there is only a fairly small chance that government spending shocks crowd-in aggregate consumption. not binding, the net impact on output is positive, but the value of the …scal multiplier is below one. 13 Moreover, the presence of …nancial frictions does not signi…cantly a¤ect the magnitude of the …scal multiplier if the ZLB constraint is not binding. In contrast, when the ZLB is binding, the multipliers become larger in the model with the FA mechanism. Therefore, the combination of …nancial frictions and the ZLB increases the multiplier substantially:
the government spending multiplier is slightly larger than one, as displayed in the fourth row of Table 2 . The underlying intuition is that the FA mechanism is associated with large declines in output when the ZLB binds and hence is also associated with large values of the government-spending multiplier because the …scal stimulus becomes more "powerful". In the model with …nancial frictions, the …scal stimulus reduces the external …nance risk premium and hence encourages investment. The crowding-out e¤ect is negligible. There is therefore an additional gain which is lacking in the model without …nancial friction, where the …scal stimulus has no impact on the net worth and on the external risk premium and public expenditures crowd-out private investments. This …nding also con…rms the results in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) that multipliers are larger in economies in which the output cost associated with the zero-bound problem is more severe, in this case in the economies with …nancial frictions.
These results prove that in a framework with …nancial frictions, the ef…ciency of government spending to stimulate output in more than a oneby-one basis depends not only on the presence of the ZLB, but also on the 13 In this paper, I compute the cumulative …scal multiplier, which is the short-term e¤ect of …scal stimulus is calculated over a one-year horizon. The multiplier is computed Table 2 (row 6) displays the …scal multiplier in case of a prolonged …scal stimulus. In this case, the …scal stimulus is still modelled as a 1% highly persistent shock to the government expenditure, but now it is implemented for 4 periods (namely, as long as the nominal interest rate is at the ZLB). In this case, the multiplier e¤ect is still positive and higher than those arising in a situation in which the ZLB is not binding. Nevertheless, the prolonged …scal stimulus is less e¤ective than a temporary one.
Fiscal stimulus becomes even counter-productive, if it is expected to con-tinue beyond the point at which the ZLB ceases to bind. Table 2 (row 7) suggests that if the …scal stimulus lasts 5 periods, it has contractionary e¤ects on output, as shown by the negative value of the multiplier.
It has often been argued that one of the disadvantages of discretionary …scal policy is that it is not timely, due to implementation lags. The last row of Table 2 shows the size of the government spending multiplier in the presence of implementation lags. If government spending still comes on line in future periods when the nominal interest rate is zero, but is delayed, the e¤ects on output remain quite large, even though weaker than those generated by a "timely"…scal intervention.
The size of …scal multipliers depends sensitively on the model's parameter values and on the strength of the central bank's o¤setting reaction. Some robustness checks prove that the relative magnitude of …scal multipliers remains una¤ected for alternative values of some key parameters. Therefore, the main conclusions remain unaltered. 15 
Conclusions
In this paper, I have analyzed the implications of the ZLB on nominal interest rates in a DSGE model with …nancial frictions. Three main …ndings are worth highlighting. First, in a framework with …nancial frictions, a binding constraint on nominal interest rates ampli…es the recession. Second, following a de ‡ationary shock, a PLT rule makes the ZLB less likely to be hit, because the private sector's expectations of future in ‡ation after a de ‡ation-ary shock dampen the initial disin ‡ation and hence stabilize interest rates.
Third, an increase in government spending cushions the output fall but leads to crowding-out of private consumption. Therefore, the net impact of a …scal stimulus on output is still positive, but the value of the …scal multiplier is below one. However, the combination of a binding ZLB constraint and …nan-cial frictions ampli…es the expansionary e¤ects of the government spending shock and generates …scal multipliers larger than one. The underlying reason is that in the model with …nancial frictions, the …scal stimulus reduces the external …nance risk premium and hence encourages investment. There is therefore an additional gain which is lacking in the model without …nancial friction, where the …scal stimulus has no impact on the net worth and on the external risk premium and where public expenditures crowd-out private investments.
Concerning the e¤ectiveness of the …scal stimulus when the nominal interest rate is close to the ZLB, two further results are worth highlighting. First, the duration of …scal stimulus turns out to be a crucial aspect to take into account in implementing …scal policy. If the …scal stimulus continues beyond the period at which the ZLB ceases to bind, then it has contractionary e¤ects on output. Second, the presence of lags in implementing discretionary …scal policy might weaken the expansionary e¤ects on output. Nevertheless, if government spending is delayed but still comes on line in future periods when the nominal interest rate is zero, the stimulative e¤ect on output remains 29 quite large.
One should aware that …scal multipliers are very sensitive to how the original stimulus is …nanced. Therefore, a further step might be to distinguish e¤ects of di¤erent types of …scal instruments. 
